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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHERMAN L. RICHENS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
Case No. 900041-CA 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, 
Driver License Services, 
Department of Public Safety, : 
State of Utah, Category No. 14(b) 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah R. App. P. 3 
and 4 (1990). The final order having been entered by the court 
below and no further claims remaining to be determined, 
plaintiff/appellant exercised his right to appeal to this court. 
This is an appeal by plaintiff, Sherman L. Richens, 
from a decision after a trial de novo in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court denying his petition and sustaining the Order of 
Revocation by the Department of Public Safety, Drivers License 
Division (hereinafter "Department") entered by the Court on its 
own motion by minute entry dated October 18, 1989. A signed 
Order was entered November 6, 1989, pursuant to Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law previously signed by the Court on August 
28, 1989. 
Richens' claim of insufficient due process implicates 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Utah 
Constitution and the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution as applied to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the notice given to a person suspected of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol fairly apprises the 
person of the duty under the implied consent statute and the 
consequences for refusing to submit to a requested chemical test. 
2. Whether the evidence adduced at trial established 
by a preponderance that the refusal was knowing and voluntary 
thereby justifying the affirmance of the administrative 
revocation. 
On appeal, the trial court's factual findings are 
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard established by Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a); conclusions of law are reviewed under a 
correctness of decision standard, Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 
139 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), T.R.F. v. Felan# 760 P.2d 906, 909 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780 
(Utah 1986); barring a misapplication of law or findings clearly 
unsupported by the evidence, the trial court's determination is 
accorded due deference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes and constitutional 
provisions are reproduced in the Addendum: 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-701 et seq. (Supp. 1989) 
Utah Code Ann- § 41-6-44 (1988 replacement) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1988 replacement) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 replacement) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 
This is an appeal by appellant Richens based upon a 
constitutional challenge to the-notice given a driver arrested 
for driving under the influence relative to the request for 
submission to a chemical test. Richens requested and received an 
administrative hearing to determine whether or not his privilege 
to drive should be revoked. At the conclusion of the 
administrative hearing, the recommendation to revoke was ordered. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (1989 replacement) and 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(d)(ii) (1988 replacement) Richens 
obtained a trial de novo in district court. At the conclusion of 
trial, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Richens' arrest was upon reasonable grounds, that he was properly 
requested to submit to a chemical test pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 41-6-44.10 (1988 replacement) and that Richens was reasonably 
warned and admonished as to consequences upon his refusal to 
submit to the requested test. 
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In light of its findings, the court concluded that 
Richens, being under arrest and being reasonably requested to 
submit to a chemical test, did refuse the test and, after being 
warned as to the consequences for his refusal, did not 
immediately request that the test be administered pursuant to the 
officer's request. The court ordered that the Department's 
revocation be sustained (R. 45-46). 
Richens appeals the trial court's decision alleging the 
warning for refusal is constitutionally deficient. The facts 
established in the proceedings below which are relevant to review 
of the issue here before the court are as follows: 
(1) The case was tried upon uncontroverted 
sworn testimony and admitted exhibit one of 
defendant. Upon stipulated facts the court 
found the peace officer had reason to 
approach and question Richens concerning an 
observed violation. Also stipulated were the 
facts establishing the reasonable grounds for 
belief by the arresting officer that Richens 
had been driving while under the influence of 
alcohol and was arrested for driving under 
the influence (R. 33-34; T. 54-58). 
(2) Richens was informed he was under arrest 
for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol; Richens responded that he did 
understand that by stating "yup." (Def. 
Exhibit § X, T. 60). 
(3) Trooper Gustin testified that he 
requested Richens to take a breath test (Def. 
References to the transcript of the trial de novo held before 
the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, Eighth District Court, Uintah 
County, shall be designated by the letter "T". References to 
portions of the record before the Utah Court of Appeals shall be 
designated by the letter "R". 
o 
The DUI Summons and Citation and DUI Report Form admitted into 
evidence at trial are marked by the district court as Defendant's 
Exhibit 1 and are enclosed in a manila envelope which is included 
with the court's record; however, they are not paginated. 
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Exhibit S X, T. 61). 
(4) Trooper Gustin testified that Richens' 
response was "nope, blood test only." (Def. 
Exhibit § Xf T. 61)• 
(5) Trooper Gustin testified he then read 
the first admonition and recorded Richens' 
response as, "my request is that I want my 
doctor here to pull it. Blood test only." 
(Def. Exhibit § X, T. 61). 
The first admonition reads as follows: 
Results indicating .08% or more by 
weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and 
the existence of a blood alcohol content or 
presence of drugs sufficient to render you 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your 
license or privilege to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(6) Trooper Gustin testified he then read 
the second admonition to which Richens 
responded, "I want a blood test only." (Def. 
Exhibit § X, T. 62). 
The second admonition reads as follows: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be 
given, however I must warn you that if you 
refuse, your license or permit to drive a 
motor vehicle may be revoked for one year 
with no provision for a limited driver's 
license. After you have taken this test, you 
will be permitted to have a physician of your 
own choice administer a test at your own 
expense, in addition to the one I have 
requested you to submit to, so long as it 
does not delay the test or tests requested by 
me. Upon your request, I will make available 
to you the results of the test if you take 
it. 
(7) Trooper Gustin testified that at no time 
did he offer or request a blood test; that 
Richens responded to each of the requests to 
take a breath test with in essence, no, I 
want a blood test only (Def. Exhibit § X, T. 
61-63). 
(8) Trooper Gustin testified that nothing 
occurred nor was said which would cause him 
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to objectively believe Richens was confused 
about or misunderstood the request for the 
chemical test by breath (T. 67). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The privilege to drive, while an important interest 
once granted, is not a fundamental interest. The privilege is 
conditioned upon observance of applicable laws. When the 
privilege to drive is subject to suspension or revocation action, 
due process requires that notice of such action be given. 
A due process analysis requires only that the notice 
given be calculated to fairly apprise the person of the nature 
and consequences of the action. At a subsequent time, a 
meaningful hearing appropriate to the nature of the competing 
private and public interests shall be afforded. This appeal does 
not challenge the hearing provided. Richens' challenge complains 
of a lack of clarity in the notice given pursuant to the implied 
consent statute. In response, the wording is not vague; neither 
must it be perfect. Due process is satisfied when a person of 
reasonable intelligence would understand the admonitions 
explaining the rights and duties under the statute. 
Richens also claims Utah's statute offends equal 
protection of laws. Inasmuch as the interest in obtaining and 
maintaining a license to drive is not a fundamental right, the 
statute will withstand a constitutional challenge if a rational 
basis exists for the law. The Department's position is that the 
legitimate public purpose of protecting and promoting public 
health, safety and welfare justifies the law. Nor does the fact 
that different language is used in a similar provision in the 
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commercial driver license law cause the implied consent statute 
to fail a constitutional challenge. Classifications are not per 
se unconstitutional. If a set of facts can be reasonably 
conceived to justify the distinctions, the classification is 
legitimate. That is the case involved in the present appeal. 
Finally, the trial court below found by a preponderance 
of the evidence that: (1) the arresting officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe Richens had been driving a vehicle in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 in that Richens' response 
was slow to the peace officer's signal to pull over, lane travel 
was improper, a chain was being dragged, Richens emanated an odor 
of alcohol and exhibited poor balance and watery, reddish eyes, 
Richens could not perform any field sobriety tests correctly, and 
Richens admitted to having consumed alcohol; (2) the warnings 
given to Richens were understandable by any reasonable person and 
did adequately advise Richens of the duties and consequences 
accompanying the request to submit to a chemical test, (3) the 
second sentence of the second admonition advised Richens that 
additional tests of his choice may be taken "in addition to the 
one" requested by the peace officer, (4) the second admonition 
would be reasonably understood and was given to Richens, (5) 
Richens did voluntarily and knowingly refuse by his acts and 
actions after being warned of the consequences for refusing. 
This set of facts supported the trial court's decision affirming 
the revocation (R. 33-35). 
-7-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE NOTICE RELATIVE TO REQUIRED SUBMISSION TO 
CHEMICAL TEST(S) WHICH IS GIVEN TO A PERSON 
ARRESTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL SATISFIES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENTS IN THAT THE INFORMATION CONVEYED 
IS NOT SO VAGUE AS TO FAIL TO FAIRLY APPRISE 
THE PERSON OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE ACTION. 
The thrust of Richens' argument stems from the issue 
raised at trial, namely, the specificity of the second admonition 
(T. 65-66) wherein the officer has the statutory discretion to 
choose which of the authorized tests and how many will be 
administered. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(b) and (c) (1988 
replacement). Richens argues that the specificity of the 
admonition throws the determination of refusal into doubt; 
specifically, did Richens refuse. From this reasoning, Richens 
now claims the procedure surrounding chemical tests to determine 
alcohol concentration violates due process, specifically the 
notice is insufficient. 
The courts of this state have repeatedly and with great 
clarity noted that the privilege to drive in this state cannot be 
taken back without procedural due process. Ballard v. State, 
Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979); Holman v. Cox, 
598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979). The Department does not take 
exception to this status. As a starting point, it must be noted, 
however, that legislative enactments are presumed constitutional. 
State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987). Following on the 
heels of this presumption, the challenger to a statute carries 
the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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statute is unconstitutional. People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916 
(Colo. 1988). Statutory construction is fairly settled in 
according legislative enactments presumed validity. If any 
reasonable construction consistent with validity can be given, 
such interpretation should be adopted. Absolute precision is not 
possible; courts recognize this. Additionally, statutes are 
written so as to apply to varied factual circumstances. This 
limited generality does not do violence to due process. See 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah 1983) for a 
succinct statement of statutory construction; see also People v. 
McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 918, 920 (Colo. 1988), a penal statute 
must be sufficiently clear; statutory construction presumes 
constitutionality without requiring precise definitions 
recognizing the necessity of limited flexibility in language; and 
see People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 771 (Colo. 1988) not only 
are statutes presumed constitutional, a fair description 
permitting common understanding will not be found 
unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable interpretation can be 
made which comports with the statutory intent; further, statutes 
must be drafted to permit application to varying circumstances 
and times. 
Richens' claim of lack of specificity lends itself to 
constitutional vagueness analysis. Therefore, if the implied 
consent statute is sufficiently precise and if the standards of 
application are particularized to avoid arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement by police officers, then the challenge 
should fail. The first step in this analysis requires reading 
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the language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1988 replacement). 
Most important to note is that anyone "operating a motor vehicle 
in this state is considered to have given . . . consent to a 
chemical test or tests. . . . " Id!. § 41-6-44.10(1) (a) . This 
section has long been found consistent with due process 
requirements. Ballard/ 595 P.2d at 1305. Thus, at the outset we 
have a person who knows a chemical test or tests can be 
reasonably requested. The only requirement the police officer 
must meet in this subsection is to act reasonably under the 
specific set of circumstances. Id., at 1305-06. Proceeding to 
the next subsection § 41-6-44.10(1)(b), the only mandatory 
language concerns the administration of blood or urine tests. 
The Utah Supreme Court had occasion to address this issue in Salt 
Lake City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1041-42 (Utah 1987). In that 
case, the appellant claimed the implied consent law violated her 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. The 
choice of tests should be hers and not the officers, she claimed, 
because of differences in accuracy. However, no evidence was 
presented supporting significant accuracy differences. The Court 
found the argument meritless. In the instant case, Richens 
claims that because the statute permits any of the three types of 
chemical test be administered, to protect his constitutional 
rights, he must be told the choice is the officer's. This runs 
contrary to the courts' prior decisions which hold that the 
statute "should be construed in a fashion to make its application 
practicable and to enable an officer to deal realistically with 
arrested drivers. . . . " Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 
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1979). Requiring an officer to enter into a discussion 
explaining choice of test, could create an environment of 
confusion and heighten a tense situation into a hostile one. 
Assume the officer states the three possible choices; assume a 
discussion ensues regarding the relative merits. Not only is the 
discussion pointless, the arrestee is conceivably confused by the 
very discussion the court is urged to rule necessary to meet due 
process requirements. The arrestee has been told things which 
still do not entitle him to dictate his choice. The next 
paragraph, § 41-6-44.10(1)(c), is still void of any mandatory 
language requiring the officer to do any specific act. 
Subsection 41-6-44.10(2)(a) does require affirmative 
acts of the peace officer. Upon refusal, the officer shall warn 
the person such refusal can result in revocation. Is this 
warning, the complete text of which has been provided above, so 
inadequate as to be unconstitutional. In Pro-Benefit Staffing v. 
Board of Review, 771 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this 
court addressed the question of adequacy of notice. Pro-Benefit 
asserted the issue was whether it had the status of "employer"; 
the Department of Employment Security notified Pro-Benefit the 
issue to be determined at the scheduled hearing was whether the 
leased employees were reportable as employees of Pro-Benefit or 
of Pro-Benefit's client. This court found that "[ajlthough the 
words vary slightly, the concepts they express are not so 
different as to fail to fairly apprise Pro-Benefit of the nature 
and consequences of the controversy." Jd. at 1112. The Utah 
Supreme Court also has determined that a statute "need only be as 
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definite and certain as the subject matter permits." State v. 
Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470, 471 (Utah 1981)- In this case the statute 
prohibiting driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and 
prudent under the circumstances was held not unconstitutionally 
vague. The standards applied encompassed having regard for 
actual and potential hazards and commonly accepted assumptions 
with respect to vehicles and speed. Thus, there was sufficient 
precision and standards were particular enough to avoid arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. 
Additional cases deciding issues close to the issues 
before this court are Larson v. Schwendiman 712 P.2d 244, 245 
(Utah 1985) and Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 
1986). In Larson the court concluded that the warning that his 
license may be revoked was adequate to apprise Larson of the 
rights and duties under the implied consent law and the 
consequences of his refusal. The facts supported the trial 
court's decision and that decision was affirmed on appeal. As 
the court noted, Larson had no constitutional privilege to 
refuse. Not having his constitutional rights read to him with 
respect to the requirements under the implied consent law was of 
no consequence to the validity of the process surrounding the 
request to take a chemical test. Lee is applicable to the 
instant case. In that case, Lee alleged she was "not clearly 
informed of the consequence" of refusing to submit to the 
chemical test. Lee, 722 P.2d at 767. The court noted evidence 
at trial supported the finding that a test had been requested; 
after Lee refused, a warning of consequences was given; applying 
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an objective test, Lee appeared to understand. She understood 
the reason for her arrest; she understood potential consequences 
to her personal life; and even though she was upset and crying 
she appeared coherent. The court the quoted from Muir v. Cox, 
611 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1980), stating "[a]n officer properly 
discharges his duty if he gives an explanation that a person of 
reasonable intelligence would understand." In a footnote to a 
previously cited case, Womack, 747 P.2d 1042 n.3, the court 
dismissed Womack's assertion that prior caselaw required that the 
peace officer read the entire implied consent law verbatim. 
Womack's reliance on those cases was misplaced, stated the court. 
The officer is merely required to apprise persons of their 
implied consent and the effect of their refusal. 
Richens cites Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451 (Utah 1976) 
and Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975) for support of 
his claim that the statutory warning required is unclear and 
therefore inadequate notice. It must be pointed out that since 
Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 352 (Utah 1979) (and a 1977 
amendment to the statute) a reasonable refusal is precluded. 
This condition coupled with the objective standard applied to 
apparent comprehension of the implied consent refusal warning 
strongly argues against Richens' claim of inadequate notice. The 
uncontroverted facts adduced at trial supported the court's 
findings by a preponderance that Richens was reasonably apprised 
as to consequences for his refusal and no confusion was 
manifested to cause the officer to believe Richens did not 
appreciate the warning. 
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Engaging in an exercise of what might be good law or 
better law or which state conducts the process of admonishing 
drivers relative to refusing a requested chemical test with "more 
process" can be interesting. It does not, however, change 
certain truths: different wording does not equate with 
inadequate notice to the point of violating due process 
protections; "there is no requirement . . . that due process of 
law must be the same in all fifty states." People v. Stevens, 
761 P.2d 768, 773 (Colo. 1988). States are free to create 
legislative solutions to problems. While the problems may be the 
same, the states are not compelled to conform to a single 
approach with the attendant procedures which must meet 
constitutional minimums. 
POINT II 
APPLYING A RATIONAL BASIS TEST, THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ADMONITIONS GIVEN TO 
DRIVERS WITH OPERATORS LICENSES AND TO 
DRIVERS WITH COMMERCIAL LICENSES WITHSTAND AN 
EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE. 
Legislative classifications are not offensive if some 
reasonable basis exists to justify the distinctions. If any 
state of facts reasonably can be conceived which would sustain 
the differences, that is sufficient; nor is exactitude required. 
Any challenge to classifications must show no rational nexus 
exists between the statute and a legitimate public purpose. See 
Utah Public Employees' Association v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273-
74 (Utah 1980) and Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 243-44 (Utah 
1979) wherein the court describes and illustrates the rational 
basis test as applied to nonfundamental private interests. The 
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privilege to drive a motor vehicle, whether a private automobile 
or a commercial vehicle, is not a fundamental right. City of 
Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1987). Therefore, a 
strict scrutiny analysis does not apply and a classification 
which is not arbitrary will withstand a constitutional attack. 
Richens' claims that the admonitions must be the same ignores the 
factual differences. First, the enactment by the Utah 
Legislature of the federal commercial driver license act was 
pursuant to the federal supremacy in the field of commercial 
interstate commerce. Inasmuch as more strict requirements and 
disqualifying factors are incorporated in the Commercial Driver 
License Act, stricter warnings could be deemed more necessary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-702 (Supp. 1989). Next, a reasonable basis 
exists for treating commercial drivers differently. The number 
of miles driven, the types of cargo transported, the 
responsibility for passengers all support any differences in 
statutes. 
The differences in wording of which Richens complains 
are without controlling import for two general reasons. One, the 
admonitions "fairly apprise" persons of their duty under the law 
and the consequences for refusing to submit to a reasonably 
requested chemical test. Two, the distinctions are not arbitrary 
since facts can be reasonably conceived which justify 
differences. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT TAKING UNCONTROVERTED 
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL DE NOVO 
BELOW WAS IN THE BEST POSITION TO ASSESS THE 
WITNESS'S CREDIBILITY; BARRING A CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS DECISION, THAT RULING SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED. 
The trial was conducted before the trial judge alone. 
While certain portions of the case were submitted to the judge on 
stipulated facts, the issue to be decided was not submitted on 
stipulation. Thus, the clearly erroneous standard applies. 
Barker v. Franics, 741 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); see Sacramento Baseball 
Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 
(Utah 1987) for a different standard of review, correctness of 
decision, if the trial court had made its decision based upon 
stipulated facts. 
This court, reviewing the record before it must be 
firmly convinced that the decision below was a clear mistake 
before overturning the decision. Trooper Gustin testified that 
he asked Richens if he understood he was under arrest for driving 
under the influence; the response was affirmative. Trooper 
Gustin testified that he asked Richens to take a breath test. 
Richens responded "nope, blood test only." Trooper Gustin 
testified he then read the first admonition (which has been cited 
above) and requested again that Richens take a breath test. The 
officer testified that Richens stated "my request is that I want 
my doctor here to pull a blood test only." The officer then read 
the second admonition (reproduced above) which warns of the 
consequences of refusal. Richens was warned that refusing the 
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test could result in revocation of his license. Richens' 
response was "he wanted a blood test only." Testimony was also 
elicited establishing that Richens did not manifest any confusion 
regarding the officer's request that he, Richens, had been asked 
to take a breath test. (References are to the transcript and 
record previously cited above in the Statement of Facts.) 
The trial court had uncontroverted evidence of a 
voluntary refusal. Applying a preponderance of evidence 
standard, the court found that the driver had refused. If 
Richens' argument is accepted, the implied consent statute would 
be effectively emasculated. Utah courts have uniformly held that 
the statute must be construed to permit an officer to 
realistically enforce the law. Imposing technical actions on an 
officer working in varied environments and dealing with the full 
spectrum of humanity is not practicable nor likely to improve the 
enforcement of this law. Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736, 
739 (Utah 1984), Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). The dissent in Conrad correctly notes the 
officer was not required to do more than he did. The driver's 
confidence in one test versus another was not argued nor 
supported by evidence and his offer to take a blood test is 
clearly not responsive to the officer's request to take a breath 
test. The majority in Conrad recognized the necessity for 
practicality: Did the driver refuse the requested test. Arguing 
by analogy, is not the counter-offer to submit to a different 
test just another way to equivocate and condition one's response 
to the officer's request. Cases uniformly hold that an express 
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refusal is not required; actions and conditional consent are 
equivalent refusals. See Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979); 
(numerous cases subsequent to Beck cite and follow its reasoning; 
See Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d at 738-39, additional 
citations omitted). 
Evidence presented at trial establish a voluntary, 
knowing refusal by a preponderance. Therefore, the decision is 
not vulnerable to a "clearly erroneous" reversal. The 
alternative review entails a determination of whether the trial 
court misapplied the law. Whether a refusal occurred or not 
turns on the set of facts. The record before this court contains 
the facts presented at trial and the findings and conclusions 
therefrom. Numerous cases, some cited above, have interpreted 
the facts required to find a refusal. The court below has not 
deviated from those decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
This case just as others, turns on its facts. Without 
intending to belabor the facts, the transcript and record before 
this court establish clearly the basis for finding a knowing, 
voluntary refusal. Trooper Gustin responded reasonably under the 
circumstances by reading verbatim the duty imposed by the implied 
consent law and the consequences for refusal. Nothing overtly 
occurred to alert the officer to any confusion. 
Not only are the facts uncontroverted and supportive of 
the decision, the statute itself is not unconstitutional under 
any analysis urged by Richens. Notice given was adequate to 
fairly apprise Richens of the duty and consequences. Sufficient 
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notice need not be perfect, just reasonably calculated to apprise 
one of the controversy. 
The trial court's ruling was entirely consistent with 
the uncontroverted factual testimony. This court should affirm 
the ruling below. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2/ «/ day of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Genera 
JEAN HENDRlCKSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
PART 7 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRIVER 
LICENSE ACT 
41-2-701. Short title. 
This part is known as the Uniform Commercial Driver License Act 
History C 1953* 41-2*701, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1989 ch 290 
1989, ch. 290, ft 21. ft 41 makes the act effective on July 1 1969 
41-2-702. Legislative intent. 
(1) The legislative purpose of this part is to implement Title XII of Public 
Law 99-570, the Federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, and to 
reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries 
by 
(a) permitting commercial operators of motor vehicles to hold only one 
commercial driver license, 
(b) lowering the alcohol concentration level at which a commercial op-
erator is disqualified, 
(c) disqualifying commercial operators uppn conviction of certain crim-
inal offenses and serious traffic-related offenses, and 
(d) strengthening licensing and testing standards for commercial vehi-
cle operator licenses 
(2) It is the intent of the Legislature that this part is remedial and shall be 
liberally construed to promote the public health, safety, and welfare 
(3) This part supersedes the general licensing provisions of state law 
History* C 1953, 41-2-702, enacted b> L. Effective Dates — Laws 1989 ch 290 
1989, ch 290, ft 22 § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 
41-2-703. Definitions. 
As used in this part 
(1) "Alcohol" means any substance containing any form of alcohol, in-
cluding but not limited to ethanol, methanol, propanol, and isopropanol 
(2) "Alcohol concentration" means the number of grams of alcohol per 
(a) one hundred milliliters of blood, 
(b) 210 liters of breath, or 
(c) 67 milliliters of unne 
(3) "Commercial dnver license (CDL)" means a license issued to an 
individual in accordance with the requirements of the CMVSA-86, that 
authorizes the holder to operate a specified class of commercial motor 
vehicle 
(4) "Commercial driver license information system (CDLIS)" means 
the information system established under CMVSA-86 as a clearinghouse 
for information related to the licensing and identification of commercial 
motor vehicle operators 
(5) "Commercial driver instruction permit (CDIP)" means a permit is-
sued under Section 41-2-708 
(6) "Commercial motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle designed or 
used to transport passengers or property, that 
(a) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or a 
lesser rating as determined by federal regulation, 
(b) is designed to transport more than 15 passengers, including the 
dnver, or 
(c) is used for transporting hazardous materials and is required to 
be placarded in accordance with 49 C F R , Part 172, Subpart F 
(7) "Controlled substance" means any substance so classified under 
Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substance Act, 21 U S C 802(6), and 
includes all substances listed on the current Schedules I through V of 21 
C F R , Part 1308 
(8) "Conviction" means: 
(a) an unvacated abjudication of guilt or a determination that a 
person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of 
original jurisdiction or an administrative proceeding; 
(b) an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure 
a person's appearance in court; 
(c) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court; 
(d) the payment of a fine or court costs; or 
(e) violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of 
whether the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated. 
(9) "Disqualification" means a prohibition against operating a commer-
cial motor vehicle. 
(10) "Division" means the Driver License Division, Department of Pub-
lic Safety. 
(11) "Drive" means: 
(a) to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle in 
any location open to the general public for purposes of vehicular 
traffic; and 
(b) in Sections 41-2-712 and 41-2-713, the operation or physical 
control of a motor vehicle at any place within the state. 
(12) "Driver" means any person who drives, operates, or is in physical 
control of a commercial motor vehicle in any location open to the general 
public for purposes of vehicular traffic or who is required to hold a CDL 
under this part or federal law. 
(13) "Driver license" means a license issued by a state to an individual, 
that authorizes the individual to drive a motor vehicle. 
(14) "Employer" means any individual or person including the United 
States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state, who owns or leases a 
commercial motor vehicle, or assigns an individual to drive a commercial 
motor vehicle. 
(15) "Felony" means any offense under state or federal law that is 
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term of more than one year. 
(16) "Foreign jurisdiction" means any jurisdiction other than the 
United States or a state of the United States. 
(17) "Gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR)" means the: 
(a) value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum loaded 
weight of a single vehicle; or 
(b) GVWR of a combination or articulated vehicle, and includes 
the GVWR of the power unit plus the total weight of all towed units 
and the loads on those units. 
(18) "Hazardous material" has the same meaning as defined under 
Section 103, 49 App. U.S.C. 1801 et seq., Hazardous Materials Transpor-
tation Act. 
(19) "Motor vehicle" means every self-propelled vehicle and every vehi-
cle propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but 
not operated upon rails, except motorized wheel chairs and vehicles 
moved solely by human power. 
(20) "Nonresident CDL" means a commercial driver license issued by a 
state to an individual who resides in a foreign jurisdiction. 
(21) "Out of service order" means a temporary prohibition against driv-
ing a commercial motor vehicle. 
(22) "School bus" means every publicly or privately owned motor vehi-
cle designed for transporting ten or more passengers and operated for the 
transportation of children to or from school or school activities. 
(23) "Serious traffic violation" means: 
(a) excessive speeding as defined by the United States Secretary of 
Transportation by regulation; 
(b) reckless driving as defined by state or local law; or 
(c) all other violations under Section 41-2-127 for which manda-
tory suspension or revocation are required. 
(24) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, or any province or territory of Canada. 
(25) "United States" means the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
History: C. 1953, 41-3-703, enacted by L. Effective uaies. — &*w» **c* v» -~v, 
1969, ch. 290, f 23 f 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 
41-2-704. Commercial motor vehicle operator — Only one 
license. 
(1) Any person who drives a commercial motor vehicle may have no more 
than one driver license, except under Subsection (2) 
(2) A person who drives a commercial vehicle may have more than one 
dnver license 
(a) during the ten-day period beginning on the date the person is issued 
a driver license, and 
(b) until December 31,1989, if a state law enacted on or before June 1, 
1986 requires the person to have more than one driver license 
History C 1953, 41-2-704, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1969 ch 290 
1989, ch 290, ( 2 4 § 41 makes the act effective on July 1 1989 
41-2-705. Driving record and other information to be pro-
vided to employer. 
(1) Any driver of a commercial vehicle who holds a driver license issued b> 
this state and is convicted of violating any state or municipal law relating to 
motor vehicle traffic control in any other state other than parking violations, 
shall notify both the division and his employer in writing of the conviction 
within 30 days of the date of conviction 
(2) A driver shall notify his employer within 30 days of the day the dnver 
receives notice that 
(a) his license is suspended, revoked, or canceled by any state, 
(b) he loses the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle in an) 
state for any period, or 
(c) he is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for an> 
penod 
(3) A person who applies to be a commercial motor vehicle driver shall at 
the time of application provide to the employer the following information for 
the ten years prior to the date of apphcation 
(a) a list of the names and addresses of the applicant's previous em-
ployers for which the applicant was a driver of a commercial vehicle as 
any part of his employment, 
(b) the dates between which the applicant drove for each employer 
listed under Subsection (a), and 
(c) the reason the applicant's employment with each employer listed 
was terminated 
(4) (a) An applicant shall certify that all information provided under this 
section is true and complete to the best of his knowledge 
(b) An employer receiving information under this section may require 
that an applicant provide additional information 
History C 1953, 41-2-705, enacted by L. Effective Dates — Laws 1989, ch 290 
1989, ch 290, ft 25 § 41 makes the act effective on July 1 1989 
41-2-706. Limitations on employment of commercial motor 
vehicle operators. 
(1) An employer shall require all applicants for employment as a commer-
cial motor vehicle dnver to provide the information as required in Section 
41-2-705 
(2) An employer may not knowingly allow, permit, or authorize a driver to 
drive a commercial vehicle during any penod when the dnver has 
(a) a dnver license that is suspended, revoked, or canceled by any 
state, 
(b) lost the pnvilege to dnve a commercial motor vehicle m a state, 
(c) been disqualified from dnving a commercial motor vehicle, or 
(d) more than one dnver license, except under Section 41-2-704 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-706, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, I 26. f 41 makes the set effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-707. Requirements to operate commercial motor ve-
hicle. 
( D A person may not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless the person 
has been issued and is in immediate possession of: 
(a) a CDL valid for the vehicle he is driving; or 
(b) a valid CDIP, and is accompanied by a person holding a valid CDL 
for the vehicle being driven. 
(2) A person may not drive a commercial motor vehicle while his privilege 
to drive a commercial motor vehicle is: 
(a) suspended, revoked, or canceled; 
(b) subject to a disqualification; or 
(c) subject to an out-of-service order. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-707, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, ft 27. ft 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-708. Qualifications for commercial driver license — 
Third parties may administer skills test. 
(1) A CDL may be issued only to a person who: 
(a) is a resident of this state or qualifies as a nonresident under Section 
41-2-710; 
(b) has passed a test of knowledge and skills for driving a commercial 
motor vehicle, that complies with minimum standards established by 
federal regulation in 49 C.F.R. Part 383, Subparts G. and H.; and 
(c) has complied with all requirements of the CMVSA-86 and other 
applicable state laws and federal regulations. 
(2) Tests required under this section shall be prescribed and administered 
by the division. 
(3) The division shall authorize a person, an agency of this or another state, 
an employer, a private driver training facility or other private institution, or a 
department, agency, or entity of local government to administer the skills test 
required under this section if: 
41-2-713. CDL classifications, endorsements, and restric-
tions. 
A CDL may be issued with the following classifications, endorsements, and 
restrictions: 
(1) Classifications: 
(a) Class A: any combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle 
weight rating (GVWR) of 26,001 pounds or more, if the GVWR of the 
one or more vehicles being towed is in excess of 10,000 pounds; 
(b) Class B: any single vehicle with a GVWR of 26,001 pounds or 
more, including that vehicle when towing a vehicle with a GVWR of 
10,000 pounds or less; and 
(c) Class C: any single vehicle with a GVWR of less than 26,001 
pounds or that vehicle when towing a vehicle with a GVWR of 10,000 
pounds or less and comprised of vehicles used: 
(i) to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver; 
(ii) as a school bus, and weighing less than 26,001 pounds 
GVWR; or 
(iii) in the transporting of hazardous materials that requires 
the vehicle to be placarded under 49 C.F.R., Part 172, Subpart F. 
(2) Endorsements and restrictions: 
(a) WH" authorizes the driver to drive a vehicle transporting haz-
ardous materials. 
(b) "I" restricts a driver to intrastate operation of a class A or B 
commercial motor vehicle. 
(c) TC" restricts the driver to vehicles not equipped with air 
brakes. 
(d) frSn authorizes driving tank vehicles. 
(e) T " authorizes driving vehicles carrying passengers. 
(f) "S" authorizes driving of school buses. 
(g) *T" authorizes driving double and triple trailers. 
(h) "X" represents a combination of hazardous materials and tank 
vehicle endorsements. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-713, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, §33. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 
41-2-714. Issuance of CDL by division — Driving record-
Expiration date — Hazardous materials provi-
sion. 
(1) Before the division may issue a CDL, the division shall obtain the driv-
ing record information regarding the applicant through the CDLIS, the NDR, 
and from each state where the applicant has been licensed. 
(2) Within ten days after issuing a CDL the division shall notify the CDLIS 
and provide all information required to ensure identification of the CDL 
holder. 
(3) The expiration date for the CDL shall be the birth date of the holder in 
the fourth year following the year of issuance of the CDL. 
(4) (a) The applicant for a renewal of a CDL shall complete the application 
form required by Section 41-2-711 and provide updated information and 
required certification. 
(b) To retain a hazardous materials endorsement upon CDL renewal, 
the applicant must take and pass the written test for hazardous materials 
endorsement in addition to any other testing required by the division. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-714, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290, 
1989, ch. 290, ft 34. M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-715. CDL disqualification or suspension — Grounds 
and duration — Procedure. 
(1) A person is disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle for a 
period of not less than one year if convicted of a first offense of: 
(a) driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, a controlled substance, or more than one of these; 
(b) driving a commercial motor vehicle while the concentration of alco-
hol in his blood, breath, or urine is .04% or more; 
(c) leaving the scene of an accident involving a commercial motor vehi-
cle he was driving; 
(d) using a commercial motor vehicle in the commission of a felony as 
defined in this part; 
(e) refusal to submit to a test to determine the concentration of alcohol 
in his blood, breath, or urine; or 
(f) driving a commercial motor vehicle while the person's commercial 
driver license is disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked. 
(2) If any of the violations under Subsection (1) occur while the driver is 
transporting a hazardous material required to be placarded, the driver is 
disqualified for not less than three years. 
(3) (a) Except under Subsection (4), a driver of a commercial motor vehicle 
is disqualified for life if convicted of two or more of any of the offenses 
under Subsection (1), or any combination of those offenses arising from 
two or more separate incidents. 
(b) This subsection applies only to those offenses committed after July 
1, 1989. 
(4) The division may make rules establishing guidelines and conditions 
under which a disqualification for life under Subsection (3) may be reduced by 
the division to a period of not less than ten years. 
(5) A driver of a commercial motor vehicle is disqualified for life if he uses a 
commercial motor vehicle in the commission of any felony involving the man-
ufacturing, distributing, or dispensing of a controlled substance, or possession 
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance. 
(6) A driver of a commercial motor vehicle is disqualified for not less than 
60 days if he is convicted of two serious traffic violations that: 
(a) occur within three years of each other; 
(b) arise from separate incidents; and 
(c) involve the use or operation of a commercial motor vehicle. 
(7) (a) The division shall update its records within ten days of suspending, 
revoking, or cancelling a CDL to reflect the action taken. 
(b) When the division suspends, revokes, or cancels a nonresident CDL, 
it shall notify the licensing authority of the issuing state within ten days 
after the action is taken. 
(8) (a) The division may immediately suspend the CDL of a driver without 
hearing or receiving a record of conviction when the division has reason 
to believe the license was issued by the division through error or fraud, or 
the applicant provided incorrect or incomplete information to the divi-
sion. 
(b) Suspension of a CDL under this subsection shall be in accordance 
with Section 41-2-128. 
(c) If a hearing is held under this section, the division shall then re-
scind the suspension order or cancel the license. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-715, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, §35. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 
41-2-716. Measurable alcohol amount consumed — Pen-
alty — Refusal to take test for alcohol. 
(1) A person may not drive, operate, or be in physical control of a commer-
cial motor vehicle while there is any measurable or detectable alcohol in his 
body. 
(2) The division or a law enforcement officer shall place a person out-of-
service for 24 consecutive hours who: 
(a) violates Subsection (1); or 
(b) refuses a request to submit to a test to determine the alcohol con-
centration of his blood, breath, or urine. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-716, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290, 
1989, ch. 290, I 36. M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-717. Prohibited alcohol level for operators — Proce-
dures, including hearing. 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable under Section 41-2-715 for a person to 
drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle 
in this state if the person: 
(a) has a blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration of .04 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged driving, operation, or physical control of the commercial motor 
vehicle; or 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to any degree that renders the person inca-
pable of safely operating a commercial motor vehicle. 
(2) A person who drives a commercial motor vehicle in this state is consid-
ered to have given his consent subject to Section 41-6-44.10 to a test or tests of 
his blood, breath, or urine to determine the concentration of alcohol in his 
physical system or the presence of other drugs in his physical system. 
(3) When a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person may 
be violating this section, the peace officer may request the person to submit to 
chemical tests to be administered in compliance with Section 41-6-44.3. 
(4) When a peace vm^* . ^ ^ . 
section, he shall advise the person that test results indicating .04 grams or 
greater alcohol concentration or refusal to submit to any test requested will 
result in the person's disqualification under Section 41-2-715 from operating a 
commercial motor vehicle. 
(5) If test results under this section indicate .04 grams or greater of alcohol 
concentration or the person refuses to submit to any test requested under this 
section, the officer shall on behalf of the division serve the person with imme-
diate notice of the division's intention to disqualify the person's privilege to 
operate a commercial vehicle. 
(6) When the officer serves notice under Subsection (5) he shall: 
(a) take any Utah license certificate or permit held by the driver; 
(b) issue to the driver a temporary license effective for 30 days; 
(c) provide the driver, on a form approved by the division, basic infor-
mation regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division; and 
(d) issue a 24-hour out-of-service order. 
(7) A notice of disqualification issued under Subsection (6) may serve also 
as the temporary license under that subsection, if the form is approved by the 
division. 
(8) The peace officer serving the notice of disqualification shall, within five 
days after the date of service, send to the division the person's license, a copy 
of the served notice, and a report signed by the officer that indicates the 
results of any chemical tests administered or that the person refused the tests. 
(9) The person has the right to a hearing regarding the disqualification 
within 30 days after the notice was issued. The request for the hearing shall 
be submitted to the division in writing and shall be made within ten days of 
the date the notice was issued. 
(10) (a) A hearing held under this section shall be held before the division 
and in the county where the notice was issued, unless the division agrees 
to hold the hearing in another county. 
(b) The hearing shall be documented and shall determine: 
(i) whether the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
person had been operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to any requested tests; 
and 
(iii) any test results obtained. 
(c) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent 
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant books and documents. 
(d) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(e) A decision made after a hearing before any number of members of 
the division is as valid as if the hearing were held before the full member-
ship of the division. 
(f) After a hearing under this section the division shall indicate by 
order if the person's CDL is disqualified. 
(11) If the division disqualifies a person under this section, the person may 
petition for a hearing under Section 41-2-131. The petition shall be filed 
within 30 days after the division issues the disqualification. 
(12) In accordance with Section 41-2-715, the first disqualification under 
this section shall be for one year, and a second disqualification shall be for life. 
(13) (a) In addition to the fees imposed under Section 41-2-112 for rein-
statement of a CDL, a fee under Section 41-2-103 to cover administrative 
costs shall be paid before the driving privilege i6 reinstated. 
(b) The fee under Section 41-2-103 shall be canceled if an unappealed 
hearing at the division or court level determines the disqualification was 
not proper. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-717, enacted by L. Effective Datet. — Laws 19S9, ch 290, 
1989, ch. 290, f 37. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41*2*718. Nonresident operator violations reported to resi-
dent state. 
When the division receives a report of the conviction of a nonresident holder 
of a CDL for a violation of a state law or local ordinance relating to traffic 
control, the division shall notify the driver licensing authority in the licensing 
state within ten days of receipt of the report. This section does not apply to 
parking violations. 
Hiftory: C. 1953, 41-2-718, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290, 
1989, ch, 290, I 38. M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 
41-2-719. Operator's driving record available for certain 
purposes. 
The division shall provide full information regarding the driving record of 
any holder of a CDL to: 
(1) the driver license administrator of any other state requesting that 
information; 
(2) any employer or prospective employer of a person to drive a com-
mercial motor vehicle upon request and payment of a fee under Section 
41-2-103; and 
(3) insurers of commercial motor vehicle drivers upon request and pay-
ment of a fee under Section 41-2-103. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-719, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 290, 
1989, ch. 290, § 39. M l makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 
41-2-720. Authority to drive commercial motor vehicle in 
Utah. 
(1) A person may drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if: 
(a) the person has a commercial driver license issued by any state or 
province or territory of Canada in accordance with the minimum federal 
standards for the issuance of commercial motor vehicle driver licenses; 
(b) the person'6 license is not suspended, revoked, canceled, or disquali-
fied; and 
(c) he is not disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle. 
(2) This section supersedes any provision to the contrary. 
ADDENDUM B 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentra-
tion — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol 
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without war-
rant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of 
license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, 
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addi-
tion to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second con-
viction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this sec-
tion adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in 
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the 
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation 
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation 
or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not rein-
state any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is 
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all 
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, as-
sessed against the person, have been paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing 
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; 
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or 
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The 
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that quali-
fies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or 
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by 
the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original 
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of 
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea of-
fered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states 
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the result-
ing conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall 
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previ-
ous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
ADDENDUM C 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or 
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other 
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test 
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test requested by 
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the re-
quested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been re-
quested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or 
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the 
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to re-
voke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the 
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form 
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer 
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the 
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of 
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division 
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practica-
ble. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall 
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the 
date of arrest. 
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the divi-
sion, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the 
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division 
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative 
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper. 
(d) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division un-
der this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a 
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person 
resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason 
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or crimi-
nal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug. 
ADDENDUM D 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 63-46b-15 
63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
History: C. 1953,63-46b-14, enacted by L. to have been issued under Subsection 
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24. 63-46b-13(3)(b)" in Subsection (3); and made 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- minor stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, divided former Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and § 315
 m akes the act effective on January 1, 
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as 1988. 
present Subsection (3); added "or is considered 
ADDENDUM E 
COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(0 appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, changes 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
248, § 8. ter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection 
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April (2)(h) as Subsection (2Ki). 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub- (2Ha), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); state and local agencies or appeals from the 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings district court review of them"; deleted "not-
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2Ka); withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision end of Subsection (2Ka); inserted present Sub-
of law" at the end of Subsection (2 Ka); inserted section (2Kb); designated former Subsections 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec- (2Kb) to (2Kh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and 
tions (2Kb) to (2Kh) as Subsections (2He) to substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
(2Hi); added "except those from the small "first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
claims department of a circuit court" at the end section (2 Kf). 
ADDENDUM F 
U.S. Const, amend. V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States 
and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges of immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
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Subject's location when first observed Q n / ^ i r a j : lju.cAe<A*. , , 
The facts observed regarding driying patterns J -Ct^H ? ^ Aj* i-u,: **r/e^ ^e-A **f f)*.U««*. 
fit. u,i-s />*. il'-^'ffi c. r *• a / /«>. 
^RE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: A / / / 
T K € ." M r S A > v^ ^ T>r> ^  U/ ; ^/ip 
I I . PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: / / 
Odor of alcoholic beverage ;//-£<> ^^ 6>"*** *
 ; ^ / r 
S p e e c h ^tk^k *DU,^*-A ^ C ^ € _ w*w-4L $ U^-*~*f <L*LJ scr^e ffsiJ CT C*~d*i^ . 
Balance /?Mk» ^ u JI * /< / 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness ey^s u^cu>*w > uj^t%<j ^pp-o^L^^f ^JLdr\L 
Other physical characteristics 
5 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? y^ Subject's ability to follow instructions /*vVh 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle. J / J f 
Was subject's vehicle searched? V-es Where? ^ fl'*~* t v fS-op. 
When? &Z2Q Evidence pp** 4-AU. jf J"*1'!^*// J ^  '^rf^ $^*~ ,a. 
jtL\^^ 4^Q^ a*.p w i ^ jiL^a ^kJr %*>*//*</ ** <L/C*I>/ a*i*[ t^ry <Ltc**Y > u^.// 
Person who performed the search ' * "% ''^AtT* ^lf u h*~^ 3 ^ V ^ ^ / 
B Subject 
Was subject's person searched? M? v Where? 
When? Evidence Found 
Person who performed the search 
CHEMICAL TESTS: , 
Mr or-Wts /vV c g**,s , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) V>i^o 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to4£termine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood I 
request that you take a ^ 2 A ^ C ^ % 
(b lood-breath-urme) / l /W /l^Jy<uA- *^Jy 
& The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered 
Results indicating 08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a blood 
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
•WhaVisf you// response to my request Jhat yoy submit? to a chemical test? Response ^W-M^JL^I^JT J^ 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? fvo . Type of test 
Test Administered by Where? 
Time Results Was subject notified of results?. 
Serial No of test machine f&J/jsip Jr 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
^C The following admonition was given by me to the subject 
If you refuse the test it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you,refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license 
After you have taken this test you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
a test at your own expense, in addition to the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does 
V not delay the test or tests requested by mi Upon-ycflur revest, JJ will make available to you the results 
N ^ of the test if you take it J( j^J^A ^ J J h ^ J b ^ svJL* 
I, $ * following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
£ S 
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J. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: J§ 
Was subject advised of the following rights? y^s When ^ 3 i ~ / > 
By Whom? A ^ " " ' * ^- / y ^ K *^ Where? / f c 5 n 
(S(- You have the right to remain silent. 
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
^ any questioning, if you wish one. 
\^4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? 
Response \^X Mr -
2. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to t^ lk to us^ now? J f f? / JO f 
Resppnse T Z ^ s /*J* f^~ **>• cs -JU^l *& a j^usr AM^ ±J ^ ^^/^^fr^ 
Jyhi (~&r+^J[u*^ ^ v / JlJLr<^> ";k™k JLA&& • • 
INTERVIEW: 
Were you operating a vehicle? ^ U L ^ 
Where were you going? V (ij^u^^y\ . j* 
What street or highway were you on?|_ j^UpT^ A<^*\ 
Direction of travel? "^ * ** — ' ^ 
Where did you start from?? \kJ(jjj(^. 
When? V y ^ yJu.xr WMat time is it now? YU,^L<L. ot/tcA 
What is today's date? v $1**- ^ •/'**<- Day of week? PK r a t. 
(Actual time Date ' / " '
 f Day / 
What city or county are you in now? A i . c / / e i n ^ / 0 ^ , 7 ^ ^ . 
What were you doing during the last three hours? flw »v »«~j, ^LA^ f>\ tJla^ h/d (Uy Jn k ^^^ 
Have you been drinking? -^  , 
What? AUMU M
 flj vr k tALy ^ c. /Lfisj HoW much? >^~f a frfiL iti*' 
Where? W f l > ^ ^ > i \ ^ i* r ^ U n V 
When did you have your first drink? \l/g>*y T w S i f o Last drink? TiQl WN.
 5 ^L ^ H ^ ^ / TL 
Are j^ ou under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? '^s4 
J rfo^ j J^r^K sj> £LCL 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? A/.^_ 
(What kind? Get sample) 
When did you have the last dose? 
Are you ill? A-Y-Q. 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were you involved in an accident today? 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? When? 
How much? 
II. OTHER OCCURRENCES 
  BR FApTS:
 f , , • I I j/ * A I / / J J 
T*fY fa*+9*+ ***** 5V<.ne, W c f 2" usc^Ayf ^f*- '***" ™**^ **lI ?* /c r- eve* fy 7 i**rrw'*i ir1** •> T - ' *» ' ^ ' r WM-w— 
II. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. % Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. £J Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. D Traffic accident report 
4. IS Other documents (specify) 
lereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached 
xuments is true and correct to my knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
jties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report. 
Signature of Peace Officer J y / / 
Law Enforcement Agency:. 
Date: S'S-V? Tims: /<&£-
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division 
4501 South 2700 West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
ADDENDUM H 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
BRUCE M. HALE (1298) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1021 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN L. RICHENS, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Director : Civil No. 89-CV-66D 
and the Office of Driver 
License Services, State of Utah, : Judge Dennis L. Draney 
Respondent. : 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court 
being regularly scheduled for a trial de novo and the parties 
being present and represented by counsel and the Court having 
heard testimony and admitted exhibit one, the DUI report form, 
and counsel for the plaintiff having stipulated to the necessary 
facts leading to the arrest, that the driver was crossing the 
center line of the street, dragging a chain on a trailer and was 
followed to a service station, and having been stopped by the 
police officer did not pass the field sobriety test, the Court 
having taken testimony and being appraised in the premises makes 
the following: 
06 \ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the information testified and 
stipulated to and the exhibit give sufficient facts to provide 
the arresting officer with reasonable grounds to believe the 
petitioner to have been driving or in actual physical control of 
a vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44. The plaintiff was slow in responding to the troopers 
spotlight was violating the law by travelling in the wrong lane 
of traffic, not having proper trailer lights and dragging a 
chain, had the odor of alcohol, poor balance, watery and reddish 
eyes, could not properly perform the horizontal gaze nystagmus 
test, the walk and balance test, the turn test and the one leg 
field sobriety test, and admitted to having had a couple drinks. 
2. The Court finds that the warnings in Roman Numeral 
XX of Exhibit One adequately advised this driver and any 
reasonable person that he must take the test requested by the 
peace officer or suffer the consequences of a revoked or 
suspended driving permit. The second sentence of the second 
admonition advised the individual driver that he may have a 
physician of his own choice administer a test in "addition to the 
one" requested by the peace officer. The Court finds that 
admonition was given to the plaintiff and that he knew or should 
have understood the admonition and did refuse. 
-2-
3. The Court finds specifically in the total facts and 
circumstances that the plaintiff was warned and refused to take 
the breath test by his acts and actions. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes as a matter of law that 
plaintiff having refused to take the breath test offered by the 
officer, no blood test being offered and being reasonably warned 
as required pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, that the 
department's actions were not arbitrary or capricious and the 
driver license division's order of revocation should be affirmed. 
2. The Court further concludes that the plaintiff was 
properly and reasonably admonished and warned of the consequences 
to his driver's permit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 
and that the peace officer is not required to specifically tell 
the plaintiff that he has no other test options under Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10(1)(b) and (c). The DUI report form read to the 
plaintiff adequately informed any reasonable driver that he did 
not have the right to demand a test other than that offered by 
that officer. 
DATED this .3 j ' /, day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEJ/ 
_§ighth District Judge ^ 03") 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Robert M. McRae, attorney for plaintiff, 209 East 100 
North, Vernal, Utah 84078, this
 t day of August, 1989. 
06h 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
BRUCE M. HALE (1298) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
,\ -
<•! 
4'/ 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN L. RICHENS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Director 
and the Office of Driver 
License Services, State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 89-CV-66-D 
Judge Dennis L. Draney 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court 
and the Court having signed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on the August 28, 1989, and the Petitioner having requested a 
ruling on his Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and the Court having reviewed the transcript of the trial, 
exhibits and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well 
as the stipulations and proffers made by the parties and the 
Court on its own motion having entered a minute entry ruling on 
October 18, 1989, pursuant to Rule 4-501 and 504 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, as well as Rule 12(cL ^ nd 54 of XAi& Utah 
Rules Civil Procedure, this matter is: 
no' j J
 K \ L. w 04 
ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The petition is denied and the Utah driving permit 
is to be revoked by the Department of Public Safety, Driver 
License Division, as required by the Utah Implied Consent Law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10. 
DATED this day of Qetefeer, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY 
Eighth District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order, was mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert M. McRae, 
attorney for plaintiff, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, 
this ^ - day of October, 1989. 
i)i\> 
ADDENDUM J 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMAN L. RICHENSr ) 
) 
PLAINTIFF, ) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPr 
) OF HEARING 
VS 
FRED SCHWENDIMAN, DIRECTOR ) 
OF DRIVERS LICENSE, STATE OF ) CIVIL NO. 89-CV-66-D 
UTAH.. ) 
) 
DEFENDANT. ) 
) 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 17TH DAY OF JULY, 
1989, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:30 A.M., THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEAPING IN THE DISTRICT 
COURTROOM OF THE DUCHESNE COUNTY COURTHOUSE, DUCHESNE, 
UTAH: SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE DENNIS L. 
DRANEY, JUDGE IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF 
UTAH. 
* * * 
ORIGINAL FILED 
JAN 1 6 1553 
COURT OF APPEALS 
052 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ROBERT M. MC RAE, ESQ, 
MC RAE & DELAND 
209 EAST 100 NORTH 
VERNAL, UTAH 84078 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: BRUCE HALE, ESQ. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 STATE CAPITAL BLDG. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
I N D E X 
FOR THE DEFENDANT PG (S) 
MERVIN GUSTIN 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HALE 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. MC RAE 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HALE 
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. MC RAE 
7 
13 
15 
16 
KATHLEEN HARRISON 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR HALE 18 
f- 053 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE RECORD WILL REFLECT 
ON RICHENS VS. SCHWENDIMAN THAT MR. RICHENS IS NOT 
PRESENT. I ASSUME THAT'S AT HIS ELECTION, MR. MC RAE? 
MR. MC RAE: I PRESUME IT'S HIS ELECTION 
BECAUSE HE WASN'T NOTIFIED, BUT HE DOESN'T NEED TO BE 
HERE 
MR. HALE: HE WAS NOT NOTIFIED OR HE WAS? 
THE COURT: WELL. HIS COUNSEL OBVIOUSLY WAS 
NOTICED. COUNSEL IS HERE. SO YOU MAY PROCEED MR. HALE. 
MR. HALE: CALL TROOPER MERV GUSTIN. 
THE COURT: TROOPER,. WOULD YOU COME FORWARD AND 
BE SWORN.. PLEASE. 
MR. MC RAE: YOUR HONOR, I'M PREPARED TO 
STIPULATE TO THE FACTS LEADING UP TO THE CONFRONTATION. 
MR. GUSTIN WAS THE OFFICER, AND BASICALLY THOSE FACTS. 
I REVIEWED THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE REFUSAL HEARING. 
BASICALLY THOSE FACTS ARE THAT TROOPER GUSTIN WAS 
WESTBOUND ON HIGHWAY 40 OVER EAST OF THE STRAWBERRY 
RIVER HERE AND HE OBSERVED A PICKUP TRUCK AND A TRAILER 
HAULING GOLF CARTS. AT LEAST THE TRAILER PART WAS 
PERIODICALLY ACROSS THE CENTER DIVIDING LINE. THAT 
PROMPTED HIM TO TURN AROUND AND FOLLOW THE TRUCK AND 
TRAILER, AND HE NOTICED THERE WAS A TAILLIGHT OUT ON THE 
054 
COMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
y 
ii 
12 
1 J 
14 
15 
1 6 
17 
18 
iy 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
TRAILER. HE TURNED ON HIS RED SPOTLIGHT AND FOLLOWED 
THE TRAILER, WHICH DIDN'T STOP IMMEDIATELY, BUT FOLLOWED 
THE TRAILER INTO THE CONOCO STATION OVER HERE BY THE 
FROSTOP. AT THAT POINT HE CONFRONTED THE PETITIONER. 
WHO WAS PUMPING GAS INTO THE PICKUP TRUCK. AND 
THEREAFTER PERFORMED CERTAIN FIELD TESTS, WHICH TO THE 
OFFICER'S SATISFACTION HE DID NOT PASS. THEREAFTER HE 
TOOK HIM TO THE JAIL HERE IN DUCHESNE FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
GIVING HIM AN INTOXILYZER TEST. 
SO FAR, BRUCE, HAVE I REASONABLY STATED WHAT 
THE TESTIMONY WOULD BE:5 
MR. HALE: YES. 
MR MC RAE: UP TO THAT POINT, THEN IF BRUCE HAS 
QUESTIONS FOR THE TROOPER. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WILL THAT STIPULATION 
BE SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR PURPOSES, MR. HALEr> 
MR. HALE: NOT ENTIRELY, YOUR HONOR. I WOULD 
LIKE TO ASK MR. MC RAE, I ASSUME THEN WE ARE STIPULATING 
THAT THE SOLE ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT WE HAVE A PROPER 
REFUSAL OR NOT UNDER THE STATUTE? 
MR. MC RAE: THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. HALE: AND WE DO NOT HAVE TO GO INTO THE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND THE REST OF IT? 
THE COURT: EXCUSE ME, BUT THE PETITION ALSO 
CLAIMS THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
-05£ 
roMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 
WELL? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MC RAE: 
COURT: 
MC RAE: 
COURT: 
THAT IS CORRECT. 
DO YOU WANT ME 
YES. 
TO DECIDE THAT AS 
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER TESTIMONY OR 
EVIDENCE ON THAT POINT, COUNSEL. 
MR. 
TO THAT ISSUE 
HALE: 
I WOULD 
REGARDING THAT. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
MC RAE: 
TEST TO THE OFFICER'S 
THE COURT: 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TH 
FOLLOW 
THINK ! 
WELL, YES. IF HE IS NOT STIPULATING 
LIKE THE COURT 
ALL RIGHT. 
I SAID HE DID 
SATISFACTION. 
THE QUESTION I• 
E STOP ITSELF. 
HIM BACK TO TOWN AND --
MR. MC RAE: 
TO HEAR TESTIMONY 
NOT PASS THE FIELD 
M ASKING IS THE 
FOR THE OFFICER TO 
THAT PROBABILITY, YOUR HONOR, I 
IF CORRECTLY STATED IS THAT HE OBSERVED AT LEAST 
THE TRAILER PORTION OF THE VEHICLE CROSSING THE DIVIDING 
LINE. 
FOLLOW 
DRIVER 
THAT I 
GUSTIN 
THAT IS ; WHAT PRECIPITATED HIM 
AND TURN ON HIS RED LIGHT AND 
AT THE 
THE 
CONOCO 
COURT: 
1M ASSUMING YOU 
WOULD TESTIFY 
FACT THERE WAS 
STATION. 
IF YOU HAVE NO 
TO TURN AROUND AND 
THEN CONFRONT THE 
OTHER TESTIMONY ON 
ARE STIPULATING THAT IS WHAT MR. 
TO THEN IfM GOING TO FIND THAT IN 
> PROBABLE CAUSE. 
0, 
COMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 5 
MR. HALE: WE WOULD PROFFER IF CALLED TO 
TESTIFY, YOUR HONOR, THAT TROOPER GUSTIN WOULD TESTIFY 
THAT HE OBSERVED A TRAFFIC OFFENSE BEFORE HE APPROACHED 
THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE, 
THE COURT: LET'S MAKE THE RECORD. 
MR. MC RAE: I'LL STIPULATE TO THAT, 
THE COURT: THAT HE OBSERVED A TRAFFIC OFFENSE? 
MR. MC RAE: YES 
THE COURT: ON THAT BASIS I'M GOING TO FIND HE 
HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE THE STOP. 
MR. MC RAE: WELL. PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONFRONT 
THE DRIVER. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THAT'S RIGHT. THOUGH 
YOU DID SAY THAT HE IN FACT DID TURN ON HIS RED LIGHT? 
MR. MC RAE: YES 
THE COURT: WELL, WHEN IT WAS -- I CONSIDER 
THAT A STOP, AND HE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO DO SO. 
MR. MC RAE: ALL RIGHT. 
THE COURT: NOW THEN, MR. HALE, YOU MAY ELICIT 
SUCH TESTIMONY THAT IS AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE OTHER 
INFORMATION. 
MR. HALE; WE ARE STILL STIPULATING THAT THE 
ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER REFUSAL UNDER 
THE STATUTE? 
MR. MC RAE: THAT'S CORRECT. 
05V 
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MERVIN GUSTIN, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALE 
Q. WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT YOUR NAME AND 
EMPLOYMENT, PLEASE? 
A. MERVIN GUSTIN. TROOPER WITH THE UTAH HIGHWAY 
PATROL. 
O. I SHOW YOU A THREE-PAGE DOCUMENT ENTITLED DUI 
SUMMONS AND CITATION AND DUI REPORT FORM. IT BEARS THE 
DATE OF 5/5/89, THE FACTS ABOUT A DRIVING PATTERN THAT 
MR. MC RAE HAS REITERATED, MR. RICHENS* NAME AND YOUR 
SIGNATURE. IT INDICATES THAT HE WAS ARRESTED AT THE 
HOUR OF 23:30 MILITARY TIME, FOR DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE, AFTER FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS AND OBSERVATIONS 
BY YOU AND ADMISSIONS -- PRE-ARREST ADMISSIONS BY HIM. 
DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT DOCUMENT, PLEASE? 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE THAT MARKED? 
MR. HALE: YES. IT'S EXHIBIT 1, YOUR HONOR. 
DEFENDANT'S. 
THE WITNESS: YES, I DO. THAT IS THE FORM I 
058 
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FILED OUT FOR MR. RICHENS. 
Q. (BY MR. HALE) THAT'S THE DRIVER'S LICENSE NCA 
COPY THAT YOU SUBMITTED TO YOUR DRIVER'S LICENSE 
DIVISION? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
O. 
YES, IT IS 
AND IS THAT IN YOUR OWN HANDWRITING? 
YES, IT IS. 
IS THAT THE DOCUMENT YOU ARE REQUIRED BY LAW TO 
FILL OUT AND SUBMIT? 
YES, IT IS. 
Q. AND DID YOU APPEAR AT A HEARING BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT AND GIVE TESTIMONY REGARDING THIS EVENT? 
A. YES.. I DID. 
Q. AND MR. MC RAE WAS PRESENT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT 
O. AND YOU GAVE TESTIMONY UNDER OATH? 
A. I DID. 
O. AND IS THAT — DOES THAT DOCUMENT ACCURATELY 
REFLECT YOUR RECOLLECTION AT THE TIME THAT YOU PREPARED 
IT? 
YES, IT DOES. 
O. DID YOU PREPARE THAT CONTEMPORANEOUS, MEANING 
ABOUT THE TIME OF THE THE STOP AND THE ARREST? 
A. YES, I DID. 
MR. HALE: WE WOULD MOVE TO ADMIT IT, PLEASE 
05b 
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MR. MC RAE: NO OBJECTION 
THE COURT: EXHIBIT 1 IS RECEIVED. 
Q. (BY MR. HALE) NOW, THAT DOCUMENT, UNDER SUB-
SECTION 10, TROOPER THERE IS A SECTION ON — ENTITLED 
CHEMICAL TESTS. DID YOU FOLLOW THE SEQUENCE OF THAT 
SUBSECTION IN MAKING A REQUEST OF MR. RICHENS THAT HE 
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST? 
A. YES, I DID, 
Q. WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT WHAT YOU DID AND WHAT 
THE RESPONSES WERE, IF ANY? 
A. WELL, I SAID, "MR. RICHENS, DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
THAT YOU ARE UNDER ARREST FOR DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL?1' 
HIS RESPONSE WAS, "YUP." 
O. NOW, WHERE WERE YOU LOCATED WHEN YOU SAID THAT, 
AND HE RESPONDED IN WHAT MANNER? 
A. I WAS STANDING IN THE AREA WHERE THE 
INTOXILYZER MACHINE IS. RIGHT TO THE SIDE OF IT. 
THAT'S THE AREA WE KIND OF USE AS A BOOKING AREA AT THE 
DUCHESNE COUNTY JAIL. 
O. ALL RIGHT. AND WHO WAS PRESENT? 
A. THE JAILER, NED FILLINGIM, WAS PRESENT THERE AT 
THAT TIME. 
O. AND YOU AND MR. RICHENS? 
YES 
UoU 
COMPUTER ASSISTED TRANSCRIPT 9 
Q. AND THEN DID YOU GO ON AND READ FROM THIS 
REPORT AS IS INDICATED? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q-
ON THAT 
A. 
Q. 
SAY, IF 
A. 
WANT ME 
Q. 
REQUEST 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
TIME? 
A. 
HERE TO 
Q-
YES, I DID. 
WHICH TEST DID YOU REQUEST THAT HE TAKE? 
I REQUESTED THAT HE TAKE A BREATH TEST. 
AND WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST? 
HE SAID, nNOPE. BLOOD TEST ONLY.n 
NOW, DID YOU FOLLOW THE SEQUENCE AS INDICATED 
FORM? 
YES, I DID. 
AFTER MAKING THAT STATEMENT WHAT DID YOU DO OR 
ANYTHING? 
I GAVE HIM THE FIRST ADMONITION THERE. DO YOU 
TO READ THAT ADMONITION? 
NO. THE REPORT IS IN. 
THEN AFTER READING THAT YOU AGAIN MADE ANOTHER 
THAT HE TAKE THE TEST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
DID YOU OFFER A BLOOD TEST TO HIM? 
NO. I DID NOT. 
AND WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE AT THAT PARTICULAR 
HE SAYS, "MY REQUEST IS THAT I WANT MY DOCTOR 
PULL A BLOOD TEST ONLY." 
OKAY. WHAT WAS YOUR RESPONSE, IF ANY, TO THAT? 
061 
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A. 
Q. 
TAKE THE 
A
* 
Q. 
A. 
AND THAT 
Q. 
IF THERE 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
GONE FOR 
Q. 
TO HIM? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
I GAVE HIM THE SECOND ADMONITION. 
AND AFTER THAT DID YOU AGAIN REQUEST THAT HE 
BREATH TEST? 
NO. I DID NOT. 
WHAT DID YOU DO? 
HE JUST TOLD ME HE WANTED A BLOOD TEST ONLY, 
WAS THAT. 
OKAY. IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE HIM DID YOU SEE 
MIGHT BE A TECHNICIAN PRESENT? 
YES, I DID. 
WAS THERE ONE AVAILABLE OR NOT? 
NO. THERE WAS NOT. HE WAS INFORMED HE WAS 
THE WEEKEND. 
BUT IN ANY EVENT HAD YOU OFFERED A BLOOD TEST 
NO. I HAD NOT. 
SO WHO BROUGHT UP THE WORD BLOOD, YOU OR HE? 
MR. RICHENS DID. MR. RICHENS DID. I NEVER 
MENTIONED BLOOD TO HIM. 
Q. 
FROM THE 
HE WOULD 
ITSELF. 
DID YOU TELL HIM OR READ TO HIM THE LANGUAGE 
REPORT FORM THAT IF HE DID NOT TAKE THAT TEST 
LOSE HIS LICENSE FOR A YEAR? 
MR. MC RAE: I OBJECT. THE REPORT SPEAKS FOR 
THE WITNESS: THAT'S THE SECOND ADMONITION.. AND 
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I READ THAT SECOND ADMONITION TO HIM. 1 
Q. 
LOSE HIS 
A. 
Q. 
WARNING? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
REPORT IS 
A. 
Q-
THAT YOU 
A. 
Q. 
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS OVERRULED. 
(BY MR. HALE) WELL, DID YOU WARN HIM HE COULD 
LICENSE? 
YES, I DID. 
ALL RIGHT. AND HOW DID HE RESPOND TO THAT 
HE SAID HE WANTED A BLOOD TEST ONLY. 
HE USED THE WORD ONLY? 
YES . 
SO THE WORDING THAT YOU HAVE WRITTEN ON YOUR 
A DIRECT QUOTE, IS IT NOT? 
IT IS. 
DID HE EVER REQUEST THE BREATH TEST FROM YOU 
HAD OFFERED? 
NO. HE DID NOT. 
DID YOU SPEND SOME AMOUNT OF TIME THERE IN THE 
JAIL WHERE HE COULD HAVE OR MIGHT HAVE DONE THAT? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
COME DOWN 
ALL THAT 
HIM. 
YES, I DID. 
APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH TIME? 
HALF HOUR; 45 MINUTES. HE CALLED A FRIEND TO 
AND PICK HIM UP AT THE JAIL, AND I WAS THERE 
TIME AND THE TIME UNTIL THEY FINISHED BOOKING 
MR. HALE: ALL RIGHT. 
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THE COURT: YOU MAY CROSS-EXAMINE, MR. MC RAE. 
MR. MC RAE: THANK YOU. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MC RAE: 
TROOPER, WOULD YOU HAND THAT DOCUMENT TO THE 
JUDGE, PLEASE, EXHIBIT 1. 
AND IS IT OPEN, YOUR HONOR, TO ROMAN NUMERAL 10 
CHEMICAL TEST? 
THE COURT: YES 
Q. (BY MR. MC RAE) ALL RIGHT, TROOPER. I'M SURE 
YOU HAVE FILLED OUT SEVERAL OF THESE IN YOUR CAREER: IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. UNDER ROMAN NUMERAL TEN YOU HAVE -- IT STARTS 
OUT, HTHE FOLLOWING ADMONITION WAS GIVEN BY ME TO THE 
SUBJECT," ET CETERA. YOU READ HIM THAT? 
YES, I DID. 
Q. TO WHICH HE RESPONDED HE WANTED A BLOOD TEST 
ONLY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. HE SAID HE WANTED HIS DOCTOR 
THERE TO PULL IT, 
Q. AND THEN YOU READ THE SECOND ADMONITION 
STARTING OUT AT THE BOTTOM OF THAT PAGE, "IF YOU REFUSE 
THE TEST, IT WILL NOT BE GIVEN. HOWEVER, I MUST 
l.H< 
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WARN 
CASE 
1989 
WERE 
THE 
YOU, 
A. 
Q. 
" ET CETERA; IS THAT CORRECT? 1 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
NOW, AT THE HEARING THAT WAS CONDUCTED IN THIS 
BEFORE THE DRIVER'S LICENSE BUREAU ON l H K 5 OF JUNE 
, DO 
THE 
YOU RECALL TESTIFYING UNDER OATH THAT THOSE 
ONLY TWO STATEMENTS AND ADMONITIONS GIVEN TO 
DRIVER; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. 
Q. 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
AT ANY TIME, TROOPER, DID YOU EVER TELL THIS 
DRIVER THAT UNDER THE PROVISION OF 41-6-44.10 UCA, AS 
AMENDED, 
DETERMINE 
NO CHOICE 
THAT YOU HAD THE SOLE, EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE TO 
WHICH TEST YOU CHOOSE TO GIVE, AND THAT HE HAD 
OF WHAT TESTS THAT HE WANTED TO HAVE, AND I 
BELIEVE YOUR ANSWER WAS NO; IS THAT CORRECT? 
ARE ' 
THAT 
THE 
A. 
Q-
rHREE 
A. 
Q. 
YOU 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
AND SO WE HAVE A DRIVER WHO BY STATUTE THERE 
VALID TESTS, BLOOD, BREATH AND URINE, RIGHT? 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
AND WE HAVE A DRIVER WHO HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD 
GET THE FIRST VOTE ON WHICH TEST, AND THEN UNDER 
SECOND ADMONITION HE CAN HAVE A TEST OF HIS CHOOSING 
IN ADDITION TO YOUR TEST; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. 
TO TAKE A 
Q. 
THAT'S CORRECT. HE KNEW THAT I REQUESTED HIM 
BREATH TEST. 
BUT YOU NEVER TOLD HIM THAT THAT WAS YOUR SOLE 
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PREROGATIVE AS TO WHICH TEST YOU CHOSE TO GIVE, AND THEN 
HE COULD HAVE ANY OF THE OTHERS IF HE WANTED THEM, RIGHT? 
A. I DIDN'T TELL HIM THAT, NO. 
Q. AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT NIELS NIELSEN SAID THE 
CODE SPECIFICALLY STATES, THAT THE OFFICER WILL PICK THE 
TEST WHICH WILL BE GIVEN. WHETHER OR NOT THE DRIVERS 
ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THAT, I WOULDN'T VENTURE A GUESS. I 
THINK SOME DO AND SOME DON'T. IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT 
OF THE FACTS? 
MR. HALE: OBJECT. ASK IT BE STRICKEN, YOUR 
HONOR. AND HE IS OFFERING TESTIMONY OF A HEARING 
EXAMINER THAT'S NOT RELEVANT. 
THE COURT: OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
MR. MC RAE: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: MR. HALE? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALE: 
O. TROOPER, WAS THERE ANY NEED TO GIVE THAT KIND 
OF AN EXPLANATION? 
MR. MC RAE: I WILL OBJECT TO THAT BECAUSE THIS 
IS THE SUBJECTIVE OPINION OF THIS OFFICER, WHICH I CAN 
CALL A HUNDRED OFFICERS AND COME UP WITH A HUNDRED 
VARIOUS OBJECTIVE OPINIONS. 
MR. HALE: LET ME REPHRASE THE QUESTION. 
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MAY 
THAT 
FACT 
NOT 
THAT 
THE COURT: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. YOU 
REPHRASE THE QUESTION. 
Q- (BY MR. HALE) WAS THERE ANYTHING THAT HAPPENED 
INDICATED TO YOU THAT HE WAS CONFUSED AS TO THE 
THAT YOU WERE OFFERING HIM ONLY A HKF.ATH TEST AND 
A BLOOD TEST? 
A. 
Q. 
y 
A. 
BY MR. MC 
THE 
Q. 
EVENT 
ABSOLUTELY NOT. 
DID HE SAY OR DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD INDICATE 
NO. HE DID NOT. 
MR. HALE: THANK YOU. 
RECRQSS EXAMINATION 
RAE: 
BUT JUST TO KEEP THE RECORD CLEAR, BECAUSE IN. 
OF AN ADVERSE RULING THE COURT REPORTER IS 
HEREWITH REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSCRIBE THIS 
PROCEEDING. BUT TO MAKE THINGS CLEAR, YOU NEVER TOLD THE 
DRIVER THAT UNDER THE LAW YOU HAD THE EXCLUSIVE FIRST 
VOTE RIGHT AS TO WHICH TEST HE WAS GOING TO TAKE? 
A. IN THOSE WORDS I DIDN'T TELL HIM, BUT THAT IS 
IMPLIED IN THE ADMONITION THERE. I'M REQUESTING HIM TO 
TAKE THAT 
Q. 
TEST. 
BUT IN THAT ADMONITION IT NEVER SAYS THAT IF HE 
DOESN'T TAKE THAT TEST THAT CONSTITUTES A REFUSAL, 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
C O R R E C T ' 
A . 
Q . 
TO WHAT 
FORWARD 
OR ADD 
T E S T I F Y 
S H E HAD 
T I O N S I 
? 
Y E S I T D O E S SAY T H A T . 
D O E S I T ANYWHERE SAY YOU HAVE T H E ONLY V O T E AS 
T E S T W I L L BE 
M R . 
M R . 
M R . 
T H E 
M R . 
T H E 
H A L E : 
MC RAE 
H A L E : 
C O U R T : 
H A L E : 
C O U R T : 
G I V E N . 
I T S P E A K S FOR I T S E L F . O B J E C T I O N . 
: NO F U R T H E R Q U E S T I O N S . 
I T ' S A R G U M E N T A T I V E AS W E L L . 
A N Y T H I N G E L S E , M R . H A L E ? 
N O , S I R . 
YOU MAY S T E P DOWN. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY O T H E R W I T N E S S E S , 
MR . 
T H E 
H A L E : 
C O U R T : 
AND BE SWORN 
M R . MC RAE 
S O M E T H I N G NEW 
T H E 
M R . 
M R . 
C O U R T : 
MC RAE 
H A L E : 
AND WE W I L L ] 
Y E S . 
M R S . H A R R I S O N , W I L L 
, P L E A S E . 
: I S T H I S C U M U L A T I V E ? 
p 
WE W I L L S E E . 
: I W I L L O B J E C T TO — 
I I N T E N D TO HAVE M R S . 
P R O F F E R SOME COMMENTS 
A C O N V E R S A T I O N W I T H M R . R I C H E N S . 
T H E 
WOULD 
P R O F F E R E D . 
M R . 
C O U R T : 
MR. H A L E ? 
YOU COME 
D O E S I T O F F E R 
H A R R I S O N 
A F T E R W A R D S TK 
I F WE A R E T A L K I N G A B O U T C O N V E R S A -
L I K E T H A T ON T H E R E C O R D , NOT 
H A L E : O K A Y . 
J U S T 
AT 
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THE COURT: WOULD YOU COME FORWARD AND BE 
SWORN. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR INTEREST IN EXPEDITING THE 
CASE, MR. MC RAE. I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY. 
KATHLEEN HARRISON, 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT, 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HALE: 
Q. YOUR NAME AND EMPLOYMENT.. PLEASE? 
A. MY NAME IS KATHLEEN HARRISON. I'M EMPLOYED AS 
A JAILER AT THE DUCHESNE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
O. AND YOU HAD A CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHENS 
AFTER HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO TAKE A TEST BY THE 
TROOPER, RESPECTING THAT TEST, DID YOU NOT? 
THE COURT: EXCUSE ME, MR. HALE, BUT I'M NOT 
SURE THAT THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT MRS. HARRISON WAS 
HERE TO HAVE ANY BASIS FOR WHAT YOU HAVE NOW ASKED HER 
TO TESTIFY TO. PERHAPS WE COULD --
MR. HALE: I INTENDED MY QUESTION TO BE A 
PRELIMINARY, FOUNDATIONAL QUESTION. 
Q. (BY MR. HALE) DID YOU HAVE SUCH A CONVER-
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SATION? 
A. YES 
WERE YOU PRESENT IN THE JAIL THE EVENING THAT 
HE WAS ARRESTED AND RELEASED? 
A. YES, SIR. 
Q. AND 
A. LET ME CLARIFY. AFTER HE WAS ARRESTED I CAME 
ON DUTY. HE WAS JUST ABOUT READY TO BE BONDED AND LEAVE 
Q. OKAY. SO YOU WERE PRESENT WHEN HE WAS THERE 
LEAVING THE JAIL; IS THAT CORRECT? 
CORRECT. 
Q. AND DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH TIME HAD EXPIRED SINCE 
HE HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO TAKE THE TEST? 
A. NO. 1 DON'T, 
Q. OKAY. AND DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION 
PERSONALLY WITH MR RICHENS REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT HE 
SHOULD TAKE THE TROOPER'S TEST OR NOT? 
A. I DID, 
Q. TELL THE COURT WHO THE PARTIES WERE AND WHAT 
WAS SAID? 
A. MYSELF AND SHERM WERE IN THE HALL. I JUST COME 
ON DUTY AND I SAID, "WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE TODAY, 
SHERM?" 
AND HE SAYS -- YOU KNOW -- MORE OR LESS TOLD ME 
HE HAD BEEN PICKED UP FOR DUI AND STUFF. AND SOMEBODY 
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PRIOR TOLD ME THAT HE HAD REFUSED TO BLOW. TO TAKE THE 
BREATH TEST. 
AND I ASKED HIM ABOUT IT. "HOW COME YOU ARE 
REFUSING? YOU ARE GOING TO LOSE YOUR LICENSE A FULL 
YEAR. 
Q. DID YOU USE THE WORD BREATH TEST? 
A. I THINK I USED THE WORD BLOW. 
Q. OKAY. AND TO THAT QUESTION DID HE RESPOND? 
A. YES 
Q. WHAT DID HE SAY? 
A. HE SAID, "I'M NOT GOING TO BLOW." 
O. NOW.. YOU DIDN'T TAKE ANY NOTES? 
A . NO . 
Q. BUT — 
OFFHANDED CONVERSATION. YES. 
BUT YOU REMEMBER THAT HE SAID THAT TO YOU? 
A. YES 
Q. DID HE MAKE ANY — THEN DID YOU MAKE ANY 
EXPLANATIONS TO HIM? 
A. YES. I SAID, "WHY NOT?" I SAID, "YOU ARE 
GOING TO LOSE YOUR LICENSE FOR A FULL YEAR." 
AND HE SAID, "THEY CAN'T TAKE MY LICENSE. THEY 
HAVEN'T FOUND ME GUILTY." 
AND I SAID, "YES, THEY CAN. YOU FORFEIT YOUR 
LICENSE WHEN YOU REFUSE YOUR TEST." 
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SATION. 
BEEN 
WAS 
Q. 
AND 
AND 
ALL 
HE SAYS, "I'LL FIGHT 
IT WAS JUST MORE OR 
RIGHT. AND WAS THIS 
BONDED OR BAILED OUT, DO YOU 
A. THE GAL CAME AND GOT HIM 
WALKING THROUGH THE DOOR JUST 
SATION ENDED, 
Q-
ATTITUDE 
IT. 
ANY 
A. 
TO MY RECOLLECTION. 
THEM. H 
LESS END OF CONVER-
BEFORE OR AFTER HE HAD 
KNOW? 
— COME TO 
ABOUT 
GET HIM, 
AS THE CONVER-
WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE HIS DEMEANOR 
TOWARD THE BREATH TEST AT THAT 
THAT IT WASN'T -- HE JUST WASN 
IT WAS UNNECESSARY. 
OTHER 
QUESTIONS 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
WITI 
MR. 
THE 
• 
MR. 
HALE: THANK YOU. 
MC RAE: NO QUESTIONS. 
COURT: YOU MAY STEP 
JESSES, MR. HALE? 
HALE: NO, SIR. 
COURT: MR. MC RAE, 
MC RAE: NONE, YOUR 
DOWN, 
DO YOU 
HONOR. 
TO THE RECORDS SET FORTH IF THE PETITION 
THE 
COPY 
COURT TO THE PROVISIONS -- DOES THE 
OF THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION OR 
WOULD BE MORE 
THE 
PROPER? 
COURT: I DO NOT. 
AND 
PARTICULAR TIME 
1T GOING TO DO 
MRS . 
HAVE 
BUT 
HARRISON. 
ANY 
IN ADDITI 
, I WILL REFER 
COURT 
REVOCATION, 
HAVE A 
I GUESS 
? 
ON 
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MR. 
MR. 
MC RAE: 
HALE: 
RELEVANT. THIS IS A 
TO WHAT THE ISSUE IS, 
POINT 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
MC RAE: 
DO YOU HAVE AN EXTRA COPY 
YES, I DO. BUT I DON'T SEE 
, BRUCE? 
HOW IT'S 
TRIAL DE NOVO AND WE STIPULATED AS 
YOUR HONOR. 
WHAT IS ITS RELEVANCE, MR. 
IF YOU HAVE AN EXTRA COPY 
IT OUT TO THE COURT. 
MR. HALE: I AM HANDING THE COURT NOW, 
TO A COPY OF THE COMPUTER PRINTOUT OF THE DRIVER 
RECORD 
FILE. 
ORDER? 
MC RAE? 
I ' LL 
STAPLED 
' S 
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE BALANCE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S 
MR. 
MR. 
MC RAE: 
HALE: 
WILL LOCATE THAT. 
THAT ' S 
SEE IF 
COURT* 
MR. 
MR. 
MAILED 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. MC 
MC RAE: 
HALE: 
OUT? 
MC RAE: 
HALE: 
COURT: 
RAE CAN 
DOES IT CONTAIN A COPY OF THE 
IT CONTAINS A COPY OF THE ORDER. I 
THAT'S REALLY ALL I CARE ABOUT. 
YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE ORDER 
RIGHT. LET ME EXTRACT THAT. 
WITH MY OBJECTION. 
YOUR OBJECTION IS NOTED. 
f OVERCOME YOUR CONCERN AND 
S CONCERN ABOUT ITS RELEVANCE. 
MR. MC RAE: 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT -
DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION 
•- EXHIBIT 2 BEING RECEIVED 
WE WILL 
THE 
TO 
BY THE 
( <m 
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COURT? 
MAKE A 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
HALE: 
COURT: 
MC RAE 
OBJECT TO 
WILL YOU 
: I WILL, 
NICE, CLEAN RECORD. 
ITS MATERIALITY. 
ADDRESS ITS MATERIALITY? 
YOUR HONOR. I WANT TO 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, YOUR HONOR, PURSUANT TO 
PROVISIONS OF 
PAREN SMALL I 
THIS . 
SECTION 
63 DASH 46 SMALL 
PAREN 
I SUBMIT THAT 
OF THE CODE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
COURT. 
B DASH 5 PAREN 1 CLOSE 
TWO SMALL I'S — I DIDN'T NUMBER 
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
THE 
THAT THE ORDER OF REVOCATION IS VOID 
I'LL SUBMIT THE MATTER TO THE 
YOU KNOW MY POSITION AS 
MR. HALE: 
ADMITTED, YOUR HONOR 
HERETOFORE ENTERED. 
RECORD? 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
RETURNING IT ' 
RECORD, 
AGAINST 
MR. 
YOUR ] 
ME IT 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
MC RAE 
COURT: 
ro MR. 
MC RAE 
HONOR, 
MOVE THAT 
, BASED ON 
TO WHY WE ARE HERE. 
THE EXHIBIT NOT BE 
THE STIPULATIONS 
EXHIBIT 2 IS NOT ADMITTED. 
: BUT MAY BE RETAINED AS PART OF 
NO. WHEN IT'S NOT ADMITTED I'M 
HALE. 
THE 
: I WOULD LIKE IT MADE PART OF THE 
BECAUSE IF YOU ADVERSELY RULE 
WILL BE A MATERIAL POINT ON APPEAL. 
HALE: 
COURT: 
SAME OBJECTION AND SAME OBSERVATION. 
I'M GOING TO RETURN IT ON THE BASIS 
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THAT IT IS IMMATERIAL 
COURT. 
DO YOU HAVE 
MR. MC RAE: 
THE COURT: 
TO THE MATTERS PENDING BEFORE THE 
ANY OTHER ARGUMENT, MR. MC RAE? 
NO, YOUR HONOR. 
IT APPEARS, MR. MC RAE, TO THE 
COURT THAT YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE PROCEEDINGS IS THAT 
THE OFFICER DID NOT TELL MR. RICHENS THAT HE, THAT IS 
THE OFFICER, HAD THE CHOICE OF WHICH TEST WOULD BE 
REQUIRED; IS THAT CORRECT? 
MR. MC RAE: 
THE COURT: 
THAT YOU MADE WHEN MR. 
AMONG OTHER THINGS. 
I UNDERSTAND, BUT THAT'S THE POINT 
GUSTIN WAS ON THE STAND. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE PROVISIONS AND 
ADMONITIONS OF SECTION 
MR. MC RAE: 
10 ADEQUATELY ADVISE THE DRIVER. 
YOU MEAN ROMAN NUMERAL TEN, JUST 
TO KEEP THE RECORD VERY CLEAR? 
THE COURT: 
DRIVERS IN GENERAL AND 
THAT'S CORRECT. ADEQUATELY ADVISE 
A REASONABLE PERSON, AS WE ASSUME 
MR. RICHENS TO BE, THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE CHOICE AS TO 
WHICH TEST HE WOULD BE 
IN THE SECOND SENTENCE 
AFTER HE HAS TAKEN THE 
WOULD BE PERMITTED TO 
REQUIRED TO TAKE. HE IS ADVISED 
OF THE SECOND ADMONITION THAT 
TEST REOUESTED BY THE OFFICER HE 
HAVE A PHYSICIAN OF HIS OWN CHOICE 
ADMINISTER A TEST AT HIS OWN EXPENSE IN ADDITION TO THE 
ONE THAT WAS REQUESTED BY THE OFFICER. 
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CONSIDERING ALL OF THE ADMONITIONS AND THE 1 
LANGUAGE OF SECTION 10, THE COURT FINDS THAT THERE WAS 
IN FACT A REFUSAL BY MR. RICHENS TO THE EXTENT THAT --
BEYOND THAT WHICH WAS PERMITTED BY LAW, AND THAT THE 
REVOCATION BASED ON THAT REFUSAL WAS NOT ARBITRARY NOR 
CAPRICIOUS. YOUR NEXT POINT, MR. MC RAE. 
MR. MC RAE: 
THE COURT: 
WISH TO MAKE. 
MR. MC RAE: 
YOU ARE MAKING THE RECORD, JUDGE. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER POINT THAT YOU 
I HAD A SECOND POINT THAT I WISHED 
TO MAKE, BUT YOU REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE EXHIBIT OR EVEN 
HOLD THE EXHIBIT AS A 
THE COURT: 
TENDERED EXHIBIT PENDING APPEAL. 
VERY WELL. THE ORDER OF THE 
DRIVER'S LICENSE DIVISION REVOKING THE LICENSE OF MR. 
RICHENS IS AFFIRMED. 
THEM, MR. HALE, ON A ' 
I GUESS THAT'S WHAT WE DO WITH 
rRlAL DE NOVO. IN ANY EVENT 1 FIND 
IT IS NOT ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND THAT WILL GIVE 
YOU WHAT YOU NEED. 
MR. HALE: rHAT'S ALWAYS BEEN THE PROCEDURE, 
YOUR HONOR. YOU DO GIVE A TRIAL DE NOVO ON THE ISSUES 
HEARD BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT BELOW. 
THE COURT: 
NOW, MR. MC 
DETERMINED EFFORTS TO 
WANT THE RECORD TO BE 
ALL RIGHT. 
RAE, IN KEEPING WITH YOUR 
MAKE SURE THE RECORD IS CLEAR, I 
CLEAR THAT A TRANSCRIPT IS f|7H 
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OBTAINED AFTER A MOTION IS MADE AND THE FEES ARE PAID IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE REPORTER, NOT BY 
A STATEMENT MADE ON THE RECORD DURING TRISAL. 
MR. MC RAE: I'M AWARE OF THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
(WHEREUPON THIS HEARING WAS CONCLUDED.) 
* * * 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
I, MILO N. HARMON, RPR, OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF 
UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE BY ME STENOGRAPHICALLY REPORTED AT THE 
TIMES AND PLACES HEREIN SET FORTH; THAT THE SAME WAS 
SUBSEOUENTLY BY ME CAUSED TO BE REDUCED TO TYPEWRITTEN 
FORM CONSISTING OF PAGES 1 THROUGH 26 BOTH INCLUSIVE; 
AND THAT THE SAME CONSTITUTES A TRUE AND CORRECT 
TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY GIVEN, EVIDENCE ADDUCED, AND 
PROCEEDINGS HAD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE. 
TO WHICH CERTIFICATION I HEREBY SET MY HAND 
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